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THE ENCRYPTION PROBLEM: WHY THE COURTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY ARE CREATING A MESS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent proliferation of powerful and inexpensive encryption 
technology has given law-abiding citizens and criminals alike an 
unprecedented ability to keep their secrets safe.1 Potent encryption software is 
freely available online, and even a novice computer user now has the power to 
protect her private and confidential data behind a virtually impenetrable wall of 
protection.2 Yet, the spread of encryption has also seriously hindered law 
enforcement during the investigation of cybercrimes.3 Criminals are able to 
hide incriminating digital evidence in encrypted hard drives and volumes, 
which can make it impossible for investigators to access the data.4 
Sometimes the only way for the Government to gain access to a 
defendant’s incriminating data is to attempt to compel the defendant through a 
court order to divulge her password.5 However, this tactic, which has been 
called “compelled decryption,” has had mixed results, since some courts have 
found that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a 
defendant from being forced to disclose her password or decrypt her data.6 
There has been no authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court on the issue, and 
the lower courts have reached conflicting decisions, which has left law 
enforcement in the lurch. 
This article will not engage in an in-depth discussion of how the courts 
should decide this constitutional issue,7 but will instead analyze the past court 
 
 1. Eoghan Casey et al., The Growing Impact of Full Disk Encryption on Digital Forensics, 
8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS 129, 129 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 130. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Dario Forte, Do Encrypted Disks Spell the End of Forensics?, 2 COMPUTER FRAUD & 
SECURITY 18, 19 (2009). 
 5. Erica Fruiterman, Upgrading the Fifth Amendment: New Standards for Protecting 
Encryption Passwords, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 655, 656 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 657. 
 7. See, e.g., Aaron M. Clemens, No Computer Exceptions to the Constitution: The Fifth 
Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production of Encrypted Document or Private Key, 8 
UCLA J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2004, at 1, 24–27; Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and 
Fifth Amendment Challenges to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 514; 
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decisions on the issue and predict what future court holdings regarding 
compelled decryption will likely be. Furthermore, this article will explore how 
the proliferation of encryption technology, when combined with the rise in 
cybercrime and the mixed signals from the courts on the issue of compelled 
decryption, is causing significant difficulties for law enforcement. Finally, the 
article will examine possible solutions to these problems. 
II.  RISE OF CYBERCRIME 
The beginning of cybercrime8 as we know it9 occurred in the early 1970s 
when a teller at New York’s Dime Savings Bank used a computer to embezzle 
over $2 million.10 It was not until 1981, however, that a person was charged 
and convicted of a felony computer crime.11 In the 1990s the rates of 
cybercrime increased dramatically as more and more people were able to 
access computers and the Internet.12 By the 2000s, the rates of reported 
cybercrimes had risen to extraordinarily high levels and are, as of this writing, 
at a record high.13 
Aside from simply higher rates of reported cybercrimes, the actual cost to 
society resulting from these crimes has risen dramatically as well.14 Despite 
predictions that the cost of cybercrime would begin decreasing after 2012 due 
to improvements in security technology, the costs and occurrences of cyber 
attacks have risen in 2013.15 This is partially due to the increased costs of 
hiring security professionals to prevent and clean up after cyber attacks, but 
 
Fruiterman, supra note 5, at 662–87, for in-depth constitutional analysis and arguments on this 
issue. 
 8. Numerous academic works have attempted to define “cybercrime,” yet there is no 
agreed-upon definition of the word. Most statutes and legislation do not refer directly to 
cybercrime, but instead call it “high-tech crime,” “computer crime,” “electronic 
communications,” or “information technologies.” UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON CYBERCRIME 11–12 (Feb. 2013). 
 9. Pooja Aggarwal et al., Review on Cyber Crime and Security, 2 INT’L J. RES. 
ENGINEERING & APPLIED SCI. 48, 48 (2014) (arguing that the first cybercrime actually occurred 
in 1820 when employees at a textile manufacturing factory in France sabotaged the factory’s 
loom out of fear that the machine would replace them). 
 10. Paul Danquah & O.B. Longe, Cyber Deception and Theft: An Ethnographic Study on 
Cyber Criminality from a Ghanian Perspective, 11 J. INFO. TECH. IMPACT, 169, 170 (2011). 
 11. Id. (describing the incident where Ian Murphy, aka “Captain Zap,” broke into AT&T’s 
computer system and changed the billing clock so that people received discounted rates during 
normal business hours). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See RSA, THE CURRENT STATE OF CYBER CRIME 2013, at 1–8 (2013), available at 
http://www.RSA.com. 
 14. See Triska Hamid, Playing with Firewalls, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, http://online.wsj. 
com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703453804575479632855718318?mod=_newsreel_3. 
 15. Sean M. Kerner, Cyber-Crime Costs Continue to Rise: Study, EWEEK, Oct. 8, 2010, 
http://www.eweek.com/security/cyber-crime-costs-continue-to-rise-study.html. 
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mainly it is due to the increased frequency and audacity of the cyber attacks 
themselves. It is difficult to quantify the damage of cybercrime,16 but it is 
estimated that its effects cost companies in the United States between $24 and 
$120 billion annually.17 Furthermore, because cybercriminals are now better 
resourced and more sophisticated, tracking them down has proven to be more 
difficult and expensive.18 
The growth of the Internet has also facilitated the rapid expansion of the 
child pornography industry.19 Aside from providing a place for child 
pornographers to distribute abusive photos and videos, the Internet also allows 
pornographers to network, share tactics on how to evade law enforcement, and 
to just generally support each other.20 Furthermore, it is now possible for an 
exploited child’s picture to be shared with thousands of other individuals 
almost instantaneously.21 The costs to society incurred by the growth of child 
pornography are difficult to measure, but the personal costs to the victims are 
vast.22 Once pictures and videos of the abuse are on the Internet, they are 
nearly impossible to remove, and thus, victims describe being in a perpetual 
state of abuse and revictimization.23 As will be discussed in greater detail later 
on in this article, not only has the growth of the Internet facilitated the spread 
of child pornography, but the growth of encryption has made it more difficult 
and time-consuming to arrest and prosecute child pornographers.24 
 
 16. Pierluigi Paganini, 2013 - The Impact of CyberCrime, INFOSEC INST., Nov. 1, 2013, 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/2013-impact-cybercrime/ (citing the loss of intellectual 
property, opportunity costs, job loss, insurance, penalties to customers, and damage to brand 
image as different factors in considering the cost of cybercrime). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kerner, supra note 15. 
 19. Dan Patterson, Child Pornography and the Internet, SUMALL FOUND., http://sumall.org/ 
child-pornography-data/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (indicating that the production and 
consumption of child pornography is still growing at an extremely high rate, despite efforts by 
law enforcement to curtail it). Between 2007 and 2011, the growth of the number of child porn 
images shared on the Internet quadrupled. Id. 
 20. Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, Child Pornography on the Internet, CMTY. 
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. 2010, at 9–10 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Problem-Specific Guides Ser. 
No. 41, 2010) (noting that the Internet facilitates the cyber-stalking, procurement, and trafficking 
of children). 
 21. Editorial, Paying a Price for Child Pornography, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A16 
(describing Amy, an eight-year-old girl who was raped by her uncle, and whose photo has been 
found on more than 70,000 confiscated computers alone—and it is likely that is only the tip of the 
iceberg). 
 22. See Arjun Sethi, Who Should Pay for Child Porn Damages?, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/child-pornography-who-should-pay/2014/01/24/ 
7be4d350-8449-11e3-9dd4-e7278db80d86_story.html. 
 23. Id. One victim said of her experience, “Every day of my life I live in constant fear that 
someone will see my pictures and recognize me and that I will be humiliated all over again.” Id. 
 24. Wortley & Smallbone, supra note 20, at 22. 
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III.  WHAT IS ENCRYPTION? 
Simply put, encryption is a process of encoding electronic information in 
such a way that only parties who have the password can access the 
information.25 In the early days of computing, encryption was a complex 
technique that only experienced computer users could employ. However, 
within the last ten years, powerful and free encryption software has become 
widely available on the Internet.26 Some of this software is very simple to use, 
and now even users with minimal computer competence can utilize various 
encryption techniques.27 
The spread of free encryption software has given many computer users the 
ability to protect their private and confidential data. However, it has also 
provided criminals with a potent tool to thwart law enforcement.28 Child 
pornographers, forgers, drug dealers, white-collar criminals, and all manner of 
cybercriminals have used encryption to seriously hinder investigations into 
their wrongdoing. By hiding incriminating information behind encryption, 
criminals can make it nearly impossible for law enforcement to access the 
information unless they know the password.29 Many times, the only way for 
law enforcement to get the password is by attempting to compel the defendant 
to divulge her password, usually through a court order. However, using 
governmental coercion to force suspected criminals to give up their passwords 
can conflict with the accused’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.30 
IV.  PROLIFERATION OF ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY 
Powerful encryption software is freely available over the Internet. One of 
the most popular encryption programs is called TrueCrypt, and not only is it 
free, but it is also one of the most highly regarded and easy-to-use encryption 
programs available.31 TrueCrypt allows users to create “encrypted volumes” on 
their computers. These volumes are essentially virtual containers which users 
 
 25. See Casey et al., supra note 1, at 130. 
 26. TrueCrypt, CNET, http://download.cnet.com/TrueCrypt/3000-2092_4-10527243.html 
(last visited July 3, 2014). 
 27. See Casey et al., supra note 1, at 130. 
 28. Eoghan Casey & Gerasimos Stellatos, The Impact of Full Disk Encryption on Digital 
Forensics, 43 OPERATING SYS. REV. 93, 94 (2008). 
 29. John Leyden, Brazilian Banker’s Crypto Baffles FBI, REGISTER, June 28, 2010, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/06/28/brazil_banker_crypto_lock_out/. 
 30. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
as Applied to Compelled Disclosure of Password or Production of Otherwise Encrypted 
Electronically Stored Data, 84 A.L.R. 6th 251, 258 (2013). 
 31. Michael Kassner, Encryption for the Paranoid: Verifying TrueCrypt Source Code and 
Binaries, TECH REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/encryp 
tion-for-the-paranoid-verifying-truecrypt-source-code-and-binaries/#. 
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can move documents, movies, and other digital files into, and once the files are 
moved into the volume they cannot be opened or viewed without using the 
correct password.32 TrueCrypt also allows more advanced users to encrypt 
their computer’s entire hard drive or computer system, which makes it 
impossible for anyone without the password to view any data at all on the 
computer.33 
The original creators of TrueCrypt are anonymous34 and have stated that 
they never created a “backdoor” for government agencies or law enforcement 
to use in order to circumvent TrueCrypt’s protection. This means that the only 
way to recover files that are encrypted by TrueCrypt is to try to “crack” the 
password by using computer programs which attempt to guess various 
combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols. One method is to employ what 
is called a “brute force attack,” which involves trying every key combination in 
an effort to find the correct password that will unlock the encryption.35 
However, a brute force attack can take anywhere from a few hours to a few 
years depending on how long and complex the user makes the password, and 
depending on how powerful the hardware is that is being used by the person or 
organization trying to guess the password.36 If the TrueCrypt user creates a 
complex, twenty- to thirty-character password, then for all practical purposes 
his password will be uncrackable, regardless of how many resources the person 
or organization trying to crack the password has.37 Even the FBI (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation) and Scotland Yard, which are agencies with very 
powerful hardware and decryption programs, have been thwarted by 
TrueCrypt.38 
 
 32. TRUECRYPT FOUND., TRUECRYPT USER’S GUIDE 6 (Feb. 7, 2012), available at 
https://www.grc.com/misc/truecrypt/TrueCrypt%20User%20Guide.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 33. 
 34. See Paul Szoldra, Snowden’s Favorite Encryption Tool is “Not Secure”, BUS. INSIDER, 
May 31, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/truecrypt-shuts-down-2014-5; OPEN CRYPTO 
AUDIT PROJECT, https://opencryptoaudit.org/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (noting that while the 
original creators have, as of May 31, 2014, ceased supporting TrueCrypt, it is still available 
online, and a volunteer organization of computer experts continues to “audit” TrueCrypt in order 
to ensure the program’s security). 
 35. Brute-force Attack, COMPUTER HOPE, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/b/brut 
forc.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
 36. Kevin Fogarty, How many seconds would it take to break your password?, IT WORLD, 
June 7, 2012, http://www.itworld.com/security/280486/how-long-would-it-take-crack-my-pass 
word?page=0,1. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Not Even FBI was able to Decrypt Files of Daniel Dantas, GLOBO, June 25, 2010, 
http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=g1.globo.com/English/noticia/2010/06/not-even-fbi-can-
de-crypt-files-daniel-dantas.html; Mark Hosenball, UK asked N.Y. Times to Destroy Snowden 
Material, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/us-usa-security-
snowden-nytimes-idUSBRE97T0RC20130830?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews. 
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Other encryption programs have also become more prevalent in recent 
years. Many hard drives on the market now come with encryption programs 
already built into them by the manufacturer. Although the purpose of this 
encryption is mainly to protect a consumer’s information if the hard drive is 
stolen, it has already caused serious problems for investigators in cybercrime 
investigations.39 
V.  MODERN FIFTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”40 Defendants have 
successfully, and unsuccessfully, invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in cases where the government has attempted to 
compel them to give up the password to their encrypted files. 
Because the Supreme Court has yet to make a ruling on whether, or in 
what circumstances, compelled decryption violates a defendant’s right against 
self-incrimination, the lower courts have been left with little guidance on how 
to approach the issue of compelled decryption.41 The lower courts must apply 
Supreme Court decisions relating to cases in which criminal defendants were 
compelled to produce incriminating paper documents, and it can be difficult 
and confusing to apply those cases to cases involving compelled decryption.42 
A brief summary of the terminology and doctrines relating to this area of law is 
important to understand the lower court decisions. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the term “privilege against self-
incrimination” is not an “entirely accurate description of a person’s 
constitutional protection against being compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”43 A defendant’s compelled act of producing 
incriminating documents before the court or a grand jury does not 
automatically trigger Fifth Amendment protection, even if the documents 
contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief on the part of the defendant.44 
The protection of the privilege extends only to compelled incriminating 
communications that are, what the Court calls, “testimonial” in character.45 
Testimonial means the government must have compelled the individual to use 
“the contents of his own mind” to communicate some statement of fact.46 The 
 
 39. Casey et al., supra note 1, at 130. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 41. Nicholas Soares, The Right to Remain Encrypted: The Self-Incrimination Doctrine in the 
Digital Age, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2001, 2008 (2012). 
 42. Id. 
 43. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). 
 44. Id. at 35–36. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Fruiterman, supra note 5, at 660 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 
(1957)). 
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production of a document may be testimonial if it conveys a statement of fact 
that certain documents are under the defendant’s control or possession, or are 
authentic.47 This is called the “act-of-production” doctrine.48 However, even if 
the defendant’s act of producing documents is testimonial, if the government 
can demonstrate that it had prior knowledge of the existence, possession, or 
authenticity of the documents, the testimonial protection of the documents will 
be destroyed.49 This is what is known as the “foregone conclusion doctrine.”50 
A. United States v. Fisher and the Act-of-Production Doctrine 
The Supreme Court case United States v. Fisher laid the foundation for the 
modern act-of-production and foregone conclusion doctrines.51 In that case, 
attorneys representing clients under investigation for violating federal tax laws 
refused to hand over their clients’ taxpayer documents to the IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service) and asserted their clients’ Fifth Amendment privilege.52 The 
Court found in favor of the IRS, and in doing so created the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.53 The Court held that the Government can compel 
production where the “existence and location [of the documents] are a 
foregone conclusion and [defendant’s act of production] adds little or nothing 
to the sum total of the Government’s information.”54 The Court made it clear 
that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit “the compelled production of 
every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is 
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.”55 
Because the subpoena only forced the defendants to hand over the documents, 
and did not force them to testify about the contents of the documents, the Court 
held that the act of producing the documents was not testimonial in nature.56 
B. United States v. Doe Narrows the Scope of the Act-of-Production 
Doctrine 
Eight years after the Fisher decision, the Supreme Court reexamined the 
act-of-production doctrine in United States v. Doe.57 In that case, subpoenas 
 
 47. Id. (citing Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-
Incrimination in the Digital Era, 12 J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 11, 14 (2012). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
 55. Id. at 408. 
 56. Andrew J. Ungberg, Protecting Privacy Through a Responsible Decryption Policy, 22 
HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 543 (2009) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409). 
 57. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
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were served on the defendant for the production of certain business records 
during a grand jury investigation of alleged corruption on the part of the 
defendant.58 However, the Government had little information about the 
documents themselves, including whether the documents were even in the 
defendant’s possession.59 The defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, 
and the district court granted the motion, finding that “the act of producing the 
records would involve testimonial self-incrimination.”60 The court of appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision, and the case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court.61 
In examining the issue of whether the defendant’s act of producing the 
records was testimonial self-incrimination, the Court noted that the records in 
question were not themselves privileged, since the Government had not 
compelled the defendant to create them in the first place.62 Yet, the Court 
recognized that “complying with the subpoena would concede the existence of 
the papers” and would demonstrate “their possession or control by the 
[defendant].”63 The Court held that, in this case, the act of producing the 
documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. In distinguishing its 
holding from Fisher, the Court deferred to the court of appeals’s finding that 
the Government was “attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by 
requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against 
himself.”64 The key factor in making this determination was that the 
Government had failed to produce evidence that possession, existence, and 
authentication of the document were a foregone conclusion, since the 
Government lacked substantial information about the records’ whereabouts 
and even their existence.65 
Finally, the Court held that the Government could have compelled the 
defendant to produce the business records if it had provided the defendant with 
“use immunity”66 in regards to the potentially incriminating evidence.67 The 
Court said that, on remand, if the Justice Department decided it needed to 
compel the defendant to produce his business records, the use immunity option 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Fruiterman, supra note 5, at 667 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 612). 
 60. Doe, 465 U.S. at 605. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 610. 
 63. Id. at 613. 
 64. Id. (quoting Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 
1982)). 
 65. Fruiterman, supra note 5, at 666–67. 
 66. Doe, 465 U.S. at 615 (“Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of 
use immunity with respect to potentially incriminating evidence.”). 
 67. Id. 
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would be available,68 although information directly or indirectly derived from 
defendant’s act of producing the records would not be able to be used in a 
criminal case against the defendant.69 
C. United States v. Hubbell Limits the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine 
The 2000 case United States v. Hubbell is the most recent Supreme Court 
case dealing with the act-of-production and foregone conclusion doctrines. In 
Hubbell, the defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and tax evasion, and had 
agreed to fully cooperate with the Government in a separate ongoing 
investigation as part of his plea deal.70 However, the Government became 
suspicious that the defendant had violated his promise to fully cooperate,71 and 
a second prosecution was brought against the defendant in order to ascertain 
whether he had broken the terms of his plea bargain. Hubbell was served with 
a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to produce any documents that he 
possessed within eleven different categories of business, personal, and income-
related documents.72 
Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but 
the district court ordered him to comply with the subpoena and granted him 
immunity over his act of producing the documents.73 Hubbell then turned over 
13,120 pages of documents and records, and responded to a series of questions 
from the Government which established that all of the documents had been in 
his custody and control.74 The Government then used the information it had 
obtained from Hubbell in its case against him, and in 1998 a grand jury 
returned a ten-count indictment charging him with various fraud- and tax-
related crimes.75 
By the time the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, the main issue 
before the Court was whether the indictment should be dismissed because the 
subpoena and subsequent questioning by the Government had violated 
Hubbell’s Fifth Amendment privilege.76 The Government argued that the 
 
 68. Id. at 617. 
 69. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455 (1972) (holding that derivative use 
immunity “does not mean that one who invokes it cannot be subsequently prosecuted. Its sole 
concern is to afford protection against being forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 
penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.”). 
 70. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 30 (2000). 
 71. The Government had evidence that the defendant Hubbell had received “hush money” in 
exchange for not telling the Government the full truth. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553, 
555–56 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 565. 
 73. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 41–43. 
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existence of such documents was a foregone conclusion because all 
businessmen keep such papers.77 In responding to this argument, the Court 
noted that the Government “had not shown that it had any prior knowledge of 
either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents . . . 
and the Government cannot cure this deficiency through the overbroad 
argument that a business man . . . will always possess general business and tax 
records.”78 The Court thus found that the facts of the case fell outside of the 
“foregone conclusion” doctrine and upheld the dismissal of the indictment. 
One commentator succinctly described the Court’s decision in Hubbell 
thusly: 
Hubbell shows that the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply when the 
prosecuting authority merely presumes that the defendant has incriminating 
documents, no matter how strong that presumption. At bottom, the Fifth 
Amendment does not permit the Government to conduct “fishing expeditions” 
for documents based on mere conjecture.79 
As a final note on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court has suggested that compelling a defendant to produce 
the key to his safe would have a different testimonial nature than if he were 
compelled to produce the combination to the safe.80 The Court has indicated 
that producing the key to the safe would not be a testimonial act, but the 
production of the combination from memory would be protected under the act-
of-production doctrine since it is an “expression of the contents of an 
individual’s mind.”81 This distinction made by the Court has led some scholars 
and lawyers to argue that Fifth Amendment protection would therefore extend 
to a defendant in a compelled decryption case from being forced to produce his 
password from his own memory.82 
VI.  COMPELLED DECRYPTION CASE LAW 
Applying Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment analyses in Fisher, Doe, and 
Hubbel, which involved the Government trying to compel the defendant to 
produce paper documents, to cases where the government is trying to compel 
the defendant to give up the password to his encrypted data has been a difficult 
 
 77. Id. at 44. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Soares, supra note 41, at 2007. 
 80. David Colarusso, Heads in the Cloud, a Coming Storm the Interplay of Cloud 
Computing, Encryption, and the Fifth Amendment, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 84 (2011) 
(citing Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34–36; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9). For examples of such arguments, see Clemens, 
supra note 7, at 24–27; Bonin, supra note 7, at 514; see also Brief for Leon Gelfgatt at 1, 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (2013) No. 2012-P-0737. 
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task for the lower courts. The courts struggle with how to apply the foregone 
conclusion and act-of-production doctrines, which were originally created to 
deal with the production of physical documents, to this modern, high-tech 
dilemma. 
Therefore, using governmental coercion to force a defendant to give up his 
password has been used by the government with only mixed success. 
Typically, the prosecution will petition the court for an order which commands 
the defendant to decrypt his data under the threat of contempt if he fails to do 
so.83 Compelled decryption is a relatively recent tactic that was first used by 
the government in late 2006. Although the government was initially successful 
in obtaining these court orders, more recent cases have demonstrated that 
courts are becoming increasingly reluctant in granting such orders, with many 
refusing to do so to protect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. By protecting defendants from being compelled to decrypt their 
data, the courts have further exacerbated the difficulties already faced by law 
enforcement when investigating cybercrimes.84 
A. In re Boucher and the Beginning of Compelled Decryption 
The case law surrounding compelled decryption is relatively sparse, and 
many of the holdings are contradictory. Cases involving compelled decryption 
are becoming more common however, as law enforcement officials are 
increasingly encountering encrypted data during investigations. The earliest 
reported case involving the issue of compelled decryption is In re Boucher.85 
On December 17, 2006, Sebastian Boucher was pulled over and inspected by a 
Customs and Border Protection agent named Chris Pike while crossing the 
border from Canada into the United States. During the inspection, Officer Pike 
opened up Boucher’s laptop, and was able to examine the contents of the 
laptop’s hard drive without entering a password.86 After doing a quick search 
of the hard drive, Officer Pike located thousands of images that appeared to be 
pornographic based on the filenames of the images.87 Upon further inspection, 
officers found a file named “2yo getting raped during diaper change,” but were 
unable to open the file to view it.88 Agents asked Boucher where the “2yo 
getting raped during diaper change” file was stored on the hard drive, and 
 
 83. In re Boucher, 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 84. This is not to say that the courts which have protected defendants from disclosing their 
passwords have necessarily been incorrect in their application of Fifth Amendment case law. For 
scholarly arguments for—and against—extending Fifth Amendment protection to compelled 
password disclosure, see Fruiterman, supra note 5; Ungberg, supra note 56; Soares, supra note 
41. 
 85. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *2. 
 88. Id. 
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Boucher directed the agents to drive Z, which at the time was not protected by 
the encryption program Boucher had on his computer.89 Agents located more 
videos and photos of child pornography in drive Z, and Boucher was 
subsequently arrested.90 
Two weeks later, investigators tried to access drive Z again, but were 
unable to do so because it had been encrypted using an encryption program 
called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP),91 which required a password to access drive 
Z.92 By restarting Boucher’s laptop, agents had apparently inadvertently 
activated the encryption program.93 Investigators were unable to view any of 
the files on drive Z, and consequently could not obtain the evidence of child 
pornography. The Government attempted to gain access, but could not find any 
“backdoors” or secret entrances to access the file, and admitted that it would be 
“nearly impossible to access the encrypted files without knowing the 
password.”94 In order to gain access to the incriminating files, the Government 
sought and obtained a grand jury subpoena for the production of “any 
passwords used or associated with the computer seized from Sebastien 
Boucher on December 17, 2006.” Boucher made a motion to quash the 
subpoena, claiming that the subpoena violated his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. The District Court of Vermont agreed with Boucher 
and granted his motion.95 
The Government was granted an appeal, and on appeal the decision was 
reversed. The court quoted the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 
saying that “where the existence and location of the documents are known to 
the government, no constitutional rights are touched, because these matters are 
a foregone conclusion.”96 The court held that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
applied because Boucher had already admitted that the laptop was his, and 
because the government agents had been able to view the files before they 
were encrypted.97 Accordingly, the court denied Boucher’s motion to quash 
and ordered Boucher to provide the Government with an unencrypted version 
of the Z drive. 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *2. For more information on PGP software, see Margaret 
Rouse, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), SEARCHSECURITY, Sept. 2005, http://searchsecurity.techtar 
get.com/definition/Pretty-Good-Privacy. 
 92. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 410–11 (1976)). 
 97. Id. 
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B. United States v. Kirschner: A Court Sides with the Defendant 
After Boucher, the next case involving compelled decryption is United 
States v. Kirschner.98 The facts surrounding the case are sparse, but from the 
record it can be established the defendant was charged with three counts of 
receiving child pornography.99 The Government had issued a subpoena 
ordering the defendant to provide all the passwords associated with his 
computer and any files on it.100 Specifically, the Government wanted to gain 
access to an “encryption file” located on the computer.101 Although the record 
does not specify what kind of encryption program was being employed by the 
defendant, it is possible the “encryption file” that the court is referring to was 
some sort of encrypted volume that allows the user to store multiple files 
within it.102 
The defendant filed a motion to quash the order, and like the defendant in 
Boucher, argued that providing the government with access to his encrypted 
files would violate his privilege against self-incrimination.103 The court agreed 
and quashed the subpoena, holding that even if the defendant were to be 
granted immunity with regard to the act of producing the password to the 
grand jury, the immunity would not suffice to protect his Fifth Amendment 
privilege in response to questioning requiring him to reveal his password.104 
The court reasoned that the defendant’s act of producing the password would 
be specific testimony asserting a fact, and held “compelled testimony that 
communicates information that may lead to incriminating evidence is 
privileged even if the information itself is not inculpatory.”105 The court noted 
that the case was not about producing specific documents—it was about 
producing specific testimony asserting a fact,106 and therefore the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination protected the 
defendant. 
 
 98. United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 666. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See How to Create an Encrypted Volume, VIRGINIA TECH, http://www.ahnrit.vt.edu/On 
lineTutorials/TrueCrypt/tipsheet-how_to_create_an_encrypted_volume.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2014). 
 103. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 (1988)). 
 106. Id. 
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C. Fricosu and Doe: Two Courts with Similar Approaches but Differing 
Results 
In early 2012, two cases involving compelled decryption were decided in 
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, and in both cases the court 
utilized similar reasoning but reached different conclusions. The first case, 
United States v. Fricosu, was decided on January 23, 2012.107 That case 
involved a defendant, Ramona Fricosu, who was indicted on charges arising 
from alleged fraudulent real estate transactions.108 The government executed 
search warrants at her home, and seized multiple computers and digital storage 
devices.109 One of the items seized was a Toshiba Satellite M305 laptop, for 
which the Government obtained an additional warrant to search its contents.110 
However, the laptop’s entire hard drive was encrypted by a program called 
PGP Desktop, and federal agents’ attempts at decrypting the hard drive 
failed.111 The Government said it would allow Fricosu to enter the password 
without being observed by the Government, or otherwise provide the 
unencrypted contents of the laptop by whatever means she chose.112 Fricosu 
declined to produce the unencrypted contents of the laptop and asserted her 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.113 
The court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not applicable to 
the case, since the contents of the laptop, and any facts communicated by the 
production of those contents, were foregone conclusions.114 The court held 
“there is little question here but that the Government knows of the existence 
and location of the computer’s files. The fact that it does not know the specific 
contents of any specific documents is not a barrier to production.”115 This 
decision by the court to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine in a case where 
the Government did not have specific knowledge of even one incriminating 
document has been criticized in academia,116 and the only reported case which 
 
 107. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1232 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 108.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant 
Fricosu’s Opposition to Government’s Application Under the All Writs Act Requiring Defendant 
to Assist in the Execution of Previously Issued Search Warrants at 2, Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 
1232 (No. 1:10-cr-00509-REB) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier 
Foundation]. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.; Symantec Encryption Desktop Professional: Products & Solutions, SYMANTEC, 
http://www.symantec.com/encryption-desktop-pro (last visited February 19, 2014). 
 112. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 108, at 2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Fruiterman, supra note 5, at 676. 
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has cited the Fricosu court’s application of the foregone conclusion doctrine 
made a point to distinguish its holding from the Fricosu court’s holding.117 
The second case decided in 2012 that dealt with compelled decryption was 
United States v. Doe.118 In Doe, law enforcement officials had been 
investigating an individual who had been maintaining a YouTube.com account 
that the Government suspected of sharing explicit materials involving underage 
girls.119 Law enforcement officials tracked the suspect, identified as “Doe,” to 
a hotel in California, and applied for a warrant to search his room.120 Agents 
executed the warrant and seized seven different hard drives from the room 
where Doe was staying. Upon inspection, it became clear to the FBI examiners 
that Doe had used a free and powerful encryption program called TrueCrypt to 
encrypt portions of his hard drives.121 Doe had used TrueCrypt’s “Encrypt 
Non-System Partition” feature,122 which meant that although it was possible 
for investigators to access some of the contents of the hard drives, other parts 
(called “partitions”) were completely inaccessible without a password.123 It 
was on these inaccessible partitions that the FBI suspected Doe had stored 
child pornography.124 Doe was then issued a subpoena requiring him to appear 
before a grand jury and produce the unencrypted contents of his hard drives.125 
The Government offered him limited immunity regarding the disclosure of the 
password, but not the contents of the hard drive that were protected by the 
password.126 Doe refused and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.127 He 
was held in contempt of court and incarcerated while he awaited his appeal.128 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and 
released Doe from jail, holding that Doe’s act of decrypting and producing the 
hard drives’ contents would be sufficiently testimonial to trigger Fifth 
Amendment protection.129 The court also held that the district court erred in 
limiting Doe’s immunity to the Government’s use of his act of decryption, 
while still allowing the Government derivative use of the evidence that the act 
disclosed.130 The court noted that “even if the decryption and production of the 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. United States v. Doe, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 119. Id. at 1339. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; TRUECRYPT FOUND., supra note 32, at 6. 
 122. TRUECRYPT FOUND., supra note 32, at 50. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Doe, 670 F.3d at 1339. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1338. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1344. 
 130. Doe, 670 F.3d at 1350. 
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contents of the hard drives themselves are not incriminatory, they are a link in 
the chain of evidence that is designed to lead to incriminating evidence; this is 
sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege.”131 
The court also rejected the Government’s foregone conclusion argument. 
The court held that just because the Government was in physical possession of 
the hard drives did not mean that it knew of the existence and location of the 
electronic files stored there.132 Seizure and possession thus did not constitute 
sufficient knowledge of the existence and location of the electronic files.133 
Also, because the Government’s expert could not say whether the encrypted 
drives even contained any files,134 the Government’s prior knowledge was 
insufficient to meet the existence and location elements of the foregone 
conclusion standard.135 
The Eleventh Circuit’s broad ruling on the issue of compelled decryption 
was received enthusiastically by digital rights activists,136 although it remains 
to be seen how much influence the decision will have on courts outside of the 
Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to 
make a ruling on the issue of compelled decryption, and therefore its holding 
may have a greater persuasive effect on the other circuits.137 
D. Ongoing Encryption Cases 
There are two compelled decryption cases currently making their way 
through the courts which have garnered national attention. In each case, a 
lower court judge has, at least initially, ruled in favor of the defendant, 
indicating that the courts may be shifting toward granting defendants in 
compelled decryption cases greater protection.138 
 
 131. Id. at 1342 n.15. 
 132. Id. at 1346. 
 133. See id. at 1347. 
 134. See TRUECRYPT FOUND., supra note 32 (explaining that TrueCrypt partitions not only 
make any files that are hidden within them inaccessible, they also completely conceal their 
presence from users who do not have an authorized passcode). 
 135. Doe, 670 F.3d at 1347. 
 136. See Hanni Fakhoury, EFF to Court: Forced Decryption Unconstitutional, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., July 23, 2013, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/07/new-eff-amicus-forced-
decryption-unconstitutional. 
 137. A district court judge in Milwaukee, which is within the Eighth Circuit, has cited the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling as very persuasive in his own decision in a compelled decryption case. 
Bruce Vielmetti, West Allis Encryption Case Delves into Fifth Amendment Debate, J. SENTINEL, 
Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/west-allis-encryption-case-delves-into-fifth-
amendment-debate-gi9mrag-204772741.html. 
 138. See Kade Crockford, Massachusetts High Court Set to Rule on Whether State can Force 
You to Decrypt Your Drive, ACLU, Oct. 31, 2013, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty-national-security/massachusetts-high-court-set-rule-whether-state-can. 
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In United States v. Decryption of a Seized Data Storage System, FBI 
agents executed a search warrant for the home of Mr. Feldman and seized 
sixteen electronic storage devices or hard drives.139 Nine of the drives were 
encrypted, and the FBI was unable to break the encryption.140 As a result, 
Feldman was not arrested or charged with a crime. The Government sought to 
compel Feldman to decrypt his drives, but the magistrate judge overseeing the 
case denied the Government’s request.141 The court ruled that the act of 
producing the decrypted contents of the computer triggered Fifth Amendment 
scrutiny, and it also rejected the forgone conclusion doctrine that the courts in 
Fricosu and Kirchner had followed.142 
After the court denied the request, the Government continued to attempt to 
decrypt the drives, and eventually succeeded in decrypting one of the drives.143 
Although investigators found child pornography, Feldman still was not 
charged with a crime. When the Government asked the magistrate judge to 
reconsider his earlier decision, the court changed its mind. The defendant 
appealed to the federal district court, and the court granted a temporary stay on 
the lower court’s ruling, pending its own review. During the pendency of that 
decision, Feldman was arrested and charged with possession of child 
pornography, based on the files found in the drive which the FBI was able to 
decrypt. As of now, seven out of the nine drives are still encrypted, and it is 
uncertain if the court will compel the defendant to decrypt the remaining 
drives.144 
Massachusetts v. Gelfgatt is the second pending case involving compelled 
decryption.145 The defendant is an attorney accused of forging residential 
mortgage assignments.146 During a search of his home, the Government seized 
encrypted computers that the Government suspects contain incriminating 
 
 139. Amicus Brief of Real Party in Interest Jeffrey Feldman’s Opposition to Decryption at 1, 
United States v. Feldman, No. 13-MJ-449-RTR (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2013). Mr. Feldman was 
suspected of possessing child pornography. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wisc. April 
19, 2013), available at http://ia601700.us.archive.org/6/items/gov.uscourts.wied.63043/gov.us 
courts.wied.63043.3.0.pdf (“This is a close call, but I conclude that Feldman’s Act of production, 
which would necessarily require his using a password of some type to decrypt the storage device, 
would be tantamount to telling the government something it does not already know with 
“reasonable particularity” . . . and ordering Feldman to decrypt the storage devices would be in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right.”). 
 143. Jeffrey Brown, Feds Decrypt Two Hard Drives in Wisconsin Case, Defendant Arrested 
on CP charges, CYBERCRIME REV., Aug. 19, 2013, http://www.cybercrimereview.com/2013/08/ 
feds-decrypt-two-hard-drives-in.html. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Brief for Leon Gelfgatt, supra note 82, at 1. 
 146. Id. 
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information. The court denied a motion by the Government to compel the 
defendant to decrypt his computers, but the motion was appealed to 
Massachusetts’s appeals court. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was 
reversed,147 and it is expected to be appealed yet again.148 
VII.  EFFECTS OF THE ENCRYPTION PROBLEM 
The proliferation of encryption technology is clearly causing, and will 
continue to cause, significant problems for law enforcement. The problems for 
law enforcement have further been exacerbated by the recent court holdings 
protecting defendants from being compelled to decrypt their encrypted data. 
Because different jurisdictions have reached different conclusions about the 
constitutionality of compelled decryption, it is uncertain if the government will 
be able to compel decryption in the future. Digital forensic investigators and 
law enforcement officers must adapt to counter the proliferation of encryption 
technology, and must find new ways to circumvent suspects’ encryption 
protection. 
A. Digital Forensic Investigators 
Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science covering the investigation 
and recovery of data found in computers, mobile phones, and other digital 
devices. Digital forensics has grown from a relatively obscure field to an 
important part of many investigations.149 The field has existed less than forty 
years, and initially forensics was performed only by skilled computer 
professionals who worked with law enforcement on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis.150 However, beginning in 1999 the field entered into what some experts 
have called a “Golden Age” for digital forensics.151 Forensic tools were 
developed that allowed users with limited training to recover deleted data and 
search for email messages and other incriminating files. There was also growth 
 
 147. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 605 (2013) (finding the defendant’s 
disclosure to police during questioning that he had encrypted his data destroyed the testimonial 
nature of producing his password under the foregone conclusion doctrine). 
 148. Chris Reidy, SJC: Defendant May be Compelled to Give Investigators Access to his 
Computer Files, BOS. GLOBE, June 25, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/06/25/ 
sjc-defendant-may-compelled-give-investigators-access-his-computer-files/PANzWVKdCB2LR 
geutZNhQI/story.html. 
 149. Simson L. Garfinkel, Digital Forensics Research: The Next 10 Years, 7 DIGITAL 
INVESTIGATION 64, 64 (2010). 
 150. Id. at 66. 
 151. Id. The widespread use of personal computers and the Microsoft Windows operating 
system was one of the main factors behind the growth in the field of digital forensics. Because the 
vast majority of the public used the Microsoft Windows operating system, examiners only had to 
learn one system. The failure of the market to adopt encryption technology was also cited as a 
major reason behind the “Golden Age” of digital forensics. Id. 
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in digital forensic research and professionalization, and national standards for 
investigators were adopted for the first time.152 
Still, experts in the field are predicting that digital forensics is facing an 
imminent crisis.153 Simson Garfinkel, a leading academic and inventor in the 
field of digital forensics, has cited pervasive encryption and new legal 
challenges as the main reasons behind the coming crisis.154 According to 
Simson, the proliferation of TrueCrypt presents a major problem for 
investigators because of how difficult it is to crack.155 TrueCrypt’s “hidden 
volume” feature is particularly troublesome for investigators.156 This feature 
allows users to create a hidden volume within a standard TrueCrypt volume, 
and each volume has its own password.157 If a user is compelled to give up the 
password to his encrypted data, he can give the investigators the password to 
the standard volume, but not the hidden volume.158 Investigators will then be 
able to access the data in the standard volume, but they will have no way of 
knowing about the hidden volume’s existence. A savvy user will put private or 
mildly embarrassing files in the standard volume, but hide the actual 
incriminating data in the hidden volume.159 Because the user will appear to be 
cooperating with law enforcement by divulging his password, investigators 
may not realize that additional evidence is still concealed in the volume.160 
TrueCrypt is not the only encryption software causing problems for digital 
investigators.161 Well-known software developers such as McAfee and 
Symantec have released encryption products that support Full-Disk Encryption 
(FDE).162 FDE provides encryption for the entire hard drive, making it 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Forte, supra note 4, at 19; Garfinkel, supra note 149, at 67. 
 154. Garfinkel, supra note 149, at 67. Garfinkel also cites the proliferation of “cloud” 
computing (i.e., using files and applications over the Internet), the increased use by the public of 
operating systems other than Microsoft Windows, and growth in the memory capacity of hard 
drives and other storage devices as major problems for digital forensic investigators. Id. 
 155. Id. Garfinkel states that although TrueCrypt technology is not completely impervious to 
an attack by a skilled digital forensic examiner, circumventing the technology requires both luck 
and time on the part of the examiner. Id. 
 156. Casey et al., supra note 1, at 130. 
 157. “The principle is that a TrueCrypt volume is created within [the free space of] another 
[already existing] TrueCrypt volume. Even when the outer volume is mounted, it should be 
impossible to prove whether there is a hidden volume within it or not, because free space on any 
TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data when the volume is created and no part of 
the hidden volume can be distinguished from random data.” TRUECRYPT FOUND., supra note 32, 
at 38–39. 
 158. Id. at 37–39. 
 159. See id. at 38–39. 
 160. Casey et al., supra note 1, at 131. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Paul Rubens, Buyer’s Guide to Full Disk Encryption, ESECURITY PLANET, May 9, 2012, 
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/mobile-security/buyers-guide-to-full-disk-encryption.html. 
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impossible to access any files on the hard drive without the password.163 This 
is a serious problem for investigators, because until recently offenders who 
used encryption rarely protected every piece of data on their hard drive, and 
would often leave at least some incriminating digital evidence in unencrypted 
form (for example, their internet history or files in their browser cache).164 
However, if a hard drive is protected with full disk encryption, investigators 
will be barred from examining this evidence without the password.165 Not only 
are there a growing number of FDE software products, but hard drive 
manufacturers are building full disk encryption protection directly into some of 
the hard drives that they sell.166 Some analysts have predicted that such 
encryption may become standard for all hard drives in the future.167 The 
increasing use of Full Disk Encryption can considerably impede digital 
investigations, potentially precluding access to all the digital evidence in a 
case.168 Hard drive manufacturers are also hesitant to install any kind of 
“backdoor” into the encryption software that could allow law enforcement to 
circumvent the encryption protection.169 This means that investigators are 
forced to employ time-consuming and often unsuccessful brute-force 
techniques in the hopes of guessing the correct password.170 
Full disk encryption presents other difficulties for investigators as well. If 
investigators or police turn off a suspect’s computer during a search without 
realizing it is encrypted, the encryption software may activate and the 
investigators will no longer be able to access any of the data on the drive 
without the password, as was the case in Boucher.171 Furthermore, some 
encrypted hard drives have a safety feature in which the hard drive essentially 
self-destructs and destroys any data stored on it if it detects tampering.172 
A number of experts in the field of digital forensics have suggested 
different approaches and procedures for investigators to adopt in order to 
counter the encryption problem, which will be discussed below. However, as 
one researcher concluded, “[r]esearch is needed to develop new techniques and 
technology for breaking or bypassing full disk encryption,” and without such 
further developments, digital forensics runs the risk of becoming obsolete in 
the years to come.173 
 
 163. Casey & Stellatos, supra note 28, at 93. 
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B. Law Enforcement Officials 
Police officers and other government agents must also adapt the way in 
which they collect evidence when there is a possibility that the suspect used 
encryption. There have been numerous documented cases in which valuable 
evidence was lost because law enforcement officials mishandled hard drives or 
devices with encryption protection.174 Law enforcement officials investigating 
a cybercrime are often unaware that cutting off the power on a computer before 
a forensic duplicate175 of the computer’s hard drive has been made can cause 
any encrypted volumes on the hard drive to automatically lock up, making the 
data within it inaccessible.176 Not only can the mishandling of digital evidence 
prevent investigators from regaining access to the encrypted data, it may even 
prevent investigators from realizing that there is encrypted data on the hard 
drive in the first place.177 
VIII.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ENCRYPTION PROBLEM 
Since the encryption problem is not going away, and the courts have sent, 
at best, mixed signals about the constitutionality of compelling a defendant to 
give up the password to her encrypted data, it is imperative that other solutions 
to the problem be explored. Three solutions this article will explore are the 
development and invention of new tools and techniques for digital forensic 
investigators, improved training for law enforcement, and various legislative 
solutions. 
A. Improved Tools and Techniques for Digital Forensic Investigators 
Although encryption programs such as TrueCrypt are very difficult to 
crack if used with a strong password, that does not mean that there are not 
potential weaknesses. Exploiting mistakes made by the user can provide 
investigators with hints as to what the password may be, information about the 
files that are encrypted, and potentially even access to the encrypted data.178 
For example, if a user encrypts her data with the same or similar password she 
uses for her email, social media profile, or any other online website account, an 
investigator will likely be able to obtain the passwords to her accounts either 
through finding the saved passwords on her computer, or by obtaining a 
 
 174. Id. at 129–130. 
 175. A forensic duplicate is an exact copy of the hard drive used by forensic investigators. 
Investigators examine the copy instead of the original hard drive in order to avoid altering the 
original media. What is a Forensic Hard Drive Imaging?, FORENSICON, http://www.forensicon. 
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subpoena ordering the websites to produce the user’s password.179 Obviously, 
the investigator will not know ahead of time whether the online account 
password matches the encryption password, but it will save considerable time 
if it does, and it is therefore worthwhile to make the effort. Furthermore, even 
if the passwords do not match, the investigator may still be able to enter the 
password into a program that runs what is called a “dictionary attack,” which 
will attempt to guess variations of the password using different characters and 
numbers.180 
A more insidious way for an investigator to obtain a user’s password is to 
attempt to implant key-logging software onto the suspect’s computer without 
her knowledge and before she is arrested or her home searched.181 The 
software can record every keystroke the user makes, including when the user 
enters her encryption password. However, this can potentially raise 
wiretapping and invasion of privacy issues, and so far has only been utilized by 
the government in special circumstances.182 
There is also some indication that powerful encryption cracking tools may 
be available to digital forensic investigators in the near future. Due to the 
Snowden leaks, it has been revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) 
has been able to crack or circumvent the encryption that guards global 
commerce and banking systems.183 Of course, the resources available to the 
NSA are not going to be available to the average digital forensic 
investigator.184 Nevertheless, technological breakthroughs made by the NSA 
may one day trickle down to traditional investigators, such as the development 
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of the futuristic-sounding “quantum computer.”185 Both the NSA and civilian 
laboratories have been developing this revolutionary type of computer which 
would be “exponentially faster”186 than any current computer, and would be 
capable of breaking nearly every current form of encryption.187 Although a 
functioning version of the computer is still, at best, a long way off,188 it could 
prove to be a potent weapon in a digital investigator’s arsenal if its 
development is successful. 
B. Improved Training for Law Enforcement 
As discussed earlier, law enforcement officers are frequently unaware of 
how to handle digital devices that contain encryption technology, and 
sometimes mishandling an encrypted device can cause valuable evidence to be 
lost. An obvious solution to this problem is to train law enforcement officers 
on how to appropriately collect sources of digital evidence.189 Proper 
preparation and education can dramatically increase the chances of 
investigators and law enforcement recovering incriminating data during a 
search.190 
The Secret Service is a good example of how proper training can greatly 
aid in the collection of digital evidence and prevent the government from ever 
even needing the defendant to disclose his password. Every new agent goes 
through a week of training in computer forensics at the Secret Service 
Academy.191 In order to avoid having to attempt to crack a suspect’s 
encryption, the Secret Service began trying to seize suspects’ computers while 
they are still turned on and while the encrypted volume is unlocked.192 One 
technique employed by the Secret Service to ensure that the suspect is logged 
onto his computer when agents arrive to execute the search warrant is to 
attempt to initiate an online chat with the suspect and then send an agent 
dressed as a United Parcel Service driver to the door.193 As Secret Service 
agent Stuart Van Buren explained during a computer security conference, 
“Traditional forensics always said pull the plug. . . . That's changing. Because 
 
 185. Steven Rich & Barton Gellman, NSA Seeks to Build Quantum Computer that Could 
Crack Most Types of Encryption, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-
encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html. 
 186. Id. (explaining that the computer would utilize the theory of quantum mechanics and 
allow the computer to do multiple calculations at a single instant). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (explaining estimates range from less than a decade to multiple decades). 
 189. Casey & Stellatos, supra note 28, at 96. 
 190. Id. 
 191. McCullagh, supra note 179. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
430 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:407 
of encryption . . . we need to make sure we do not power the system down 
before we know what's actually on it.”194 
In 2009, the Secret Service planned a raid on a notorious hacker named 
Albert Gonzalez, who was suspected of gaining access to around 180 million 
payment-card accounts from the customer databases of corporations such as 
OfficeMax, Target, and JCPenney.195 Because of the expectation that the 
hacker would be hiding evidence inside of encrypted volumes, the agents 
crafted preraid and on-scene search strategies in order to maximize the 
opportunity to retrieve the data running on the computers before the computers 
were taken to a forensics lab.196 As a result of the careful planning, the Secret 
Service was able to capture critical evidence at the scene of the search, even 
though the system was protected by powerful encryption.197 Had the agents 
simply raided the home, unplugged the computers, and taken them to a 
forensics lab, it is likely much of the evidence would have been lost.198 
C. Legislative Solutions 
Attempts have been made in the past to solve the encryption problem with 
legislative action. For the most part, the legislative solutions in the United 
States have failed,199 although they have had success in other countries.200 This 
article will explore two possible legislative solutions that have been proposed. 
1. Key Disclosure 
Key disclosure statutes are currently in effect around the world.201 Key 
disclosure legislation makes it a crime for a suspect or defendant to refuse to 
disclose his password to law enforcement.202 Many common law countries 
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have adopted the mandatory key disclosure legislation as an exception to the 
privilege against self-incrimination.203 
For example, the United Kingdom’s version of key disclosure, passed as 
part of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), allows for 
sentences of “up to two years for cases not involving national security or five 
years for those that do.”204 Since its implementation in 2007, multiple 
suspected terrorists have been convicted of violating RIPA, as well as suspects 
in less serious cases.205 
If the United States were to implement key disclosure legislation similar to 
that in the United Kingdom, it would provide the lower courts with explicit 
instruction on how to handle the issue of compelled disclosure. Of course, 
passing the legislation would not permanently end the debate on compelled 
disclosure, as the courts could still overturn the statute if it was found to violate 
the Constitution.206 However, if Congress or a state legislature were to pass a 
key disclosure law, it would, at the very least, bring publicity to the issue of 
compelled decryption and possibly spur the Supreme Court to action in 
deciding how to handle the issue. 
2. Key Escrow Laws 
Key escrow207 systems are arrangements between a user of an encryption 
program and a trusted third party, approved by the government, to hold a 
backup of the user’s password.208 The user can contact the third party if she 
forgets her password, but more importantly, at least for the purposes of this 
article, the government could subpoena the third party for the password if there 
was probable cause to believe she was hiding illegal or incriminating 
information with her encryption.209 This would get around any issue of self-
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incrimination, since it would not be the suspect who was disclosing the 
password, but the third party.210 
However, one major hurdle for implementing a key escrow system is that 
the idea has proven to be unpopular.211 In the early 1990s the Clinton 
administration proposed a version of a key escrow system called the “Clipper 
Chip” initiative, which would have “offered the public high-quality 
[encryption] protection embedded in hardware in exchange for the 
government’s ability to read the underlying text . . . in certain legally 
authorized circumstances.”212 Yet the initiative was met with harsh criticism as 
well as strong public mistrust, and was eventually discarded.213 Given that 
American citizens’ overall trust in the federal government has hit an all-time 
low,214 it seems unlikely that the idea of a key escrow system will be more 
palatable to the public anytime soon. 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS 
It should now be clear that the proliferation of encryption technology is 
causing, and will continue to cause, significant problems for law enforcement 
and investigators involved in investigating cybercrime. The lower courts’ 
recent holdings protecting defendants from being compelled to decrypt their 
encrypted data are further exacerbating the problem. However, while the 
courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials wait for the Supreme Court 
to weigh in on the issue of compelled decryption, steps can be taken in the 
present and near future to assist in the investigation of cybercrime. Investing in 
new technologies and tactics for digital forensic investigators, and providing 
law enforcement officials with digital forensic training, can prevent valuable 
evidence from being lost. Legislative solutions to the encryption problem are 
also possible, but if enacted will likely face constitutional challenges and 
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protests from the public. However, regardless of the solutions that are adopted 
to combat the present encryption problem, the larger problem of technology 
outpacing society’s ability to adapt to it will still remain. Criminals will not 
simply sit back and allow law enforcement and the courts to catch up. The 
challenge for the legal system will be how do deal with it. 
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